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COMMENTARY
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: DISPELLING THE




The time is at hand for reality to replace expectation as the em-
ployment provisions of the federal mandate not to discriminate
against qualified individuals with disabilities, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (the "ADA"),1 are now the law of the land. A new
era of rights, responsibilities, and opportunities dawned for private
and governmental employers, and disabled persons when the rules
of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") went into effect on July 26, 1992. A practical, common
sense utilization of institutional solutions complemented by indi-
vidualized applications, not ad hoc reactions, is essential. Other-
wise employers' worst fears will be realized and the euphoria in the
community of disabled persons will be dashed on the rocks of frus-
trated, raised expectations.
Ultimately, the success or failure of the new law will depend on
the ability of employers and persons with disabilities to develop
real world solutions to the issues. In the short run, both the em-
ployers and disabled persons must discern the meaning and impli-
* B.A., 1964, University of Michigan; J.D., 1967, Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1968, New
York University School of Law. The author is a Washington, D.C. attorney and has written
a book entitled, DISABILITY RIGHTS GUIDE, PRAc'rlCAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS AFFECTING
PEOPLE wITH DISABILITIES. He formerly served as General Counsel of the U.S. Access Board
(Architectural Transportation Barriers Compliance Board) and is a former LEGIS Fellow.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12111-17, 12131-34, 12141-50, 12161-65, 12181-89, 12201-13 (1990).
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cations of the law, despite the EEOC's lack of clear guidance on
several potentially litigious issues.
This commentary presents a pragmatic approach to the employ-
ment provisions of the ADA, particularly the EEOC rules, and dis-
pels the myths and regulatory inadequacies that could preclude ef-
fective, balanced implementation. Suggestions on avoiding
litigation, including a sample reasonable accommodations policy,
follow the legal analysis.
II. ADA: HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
The Americans with Disabilities Act has its roots in two key fed-
eral laws: the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which had no disability-
related provisions when enacted, and Title V of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,3 which literally took years to implement. The prece-
dents under these laws, particularly the Rehabilitation Act, as well
as state and local laws prohibiting discrimination based on disabil-
ity, shed light on how to interpret the ADA.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion in employment4 and
places of public accommodation." The law covers discrimination by
state and local governments6 and private employers engaged in in-
terstate commerce.' Unions and employment agencies are likewise
included.8 Finally, this law created a new federal agency, the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to en-
force this mandate. 9
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is fundamentally a law authoriz-
ing programs for state-provided and federally funded rehabilita-
tion services, the modern era of which began after World War I to
retrain returning veterans. Title V of the 1973 enactment embodies
the foundation for the Americans with Disabilities Act.10
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-94 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988).
5. Id. §§ 2000a to a-6.
6. Id. § 2000e.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 2000e-4 (1989).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-94 (1988). For example, § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits
discrimination by the federal government in employment against qualified individuals with
disabilities, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988), and § 503, administered by the United States Depart-
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The most significant civil rights provision in the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 is section 504.11 This provision bans discrimination
against qualified disabled persons in government-sponsored pro-
grams and activities as well as discrimination against recipients of
financial assistance.12 However, the meaning of this provision was
not clear for several years, since the federal government did not
issue section 504 regulations until 1977!1s Those regulations, which
were issued from what was then the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare introduced such terms as "reasonable accommo-
dation" in employment 14 and "program accessibility" of services
and activities.15 Subsequently, primary federal government respon-
sibility was transferred to the Department of Justice by Executive
Order Number 12,250.16 The Rehabilitation Act defined "handi-
capped person" as a person with a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities of the
person, who has a record of such an impairment, or who is re-
garded as having such an impairment.17
The Rehabilitation Act, for all its grandiose, hortatory language
and ideals, is really quite limited; in order for the Act to apply,
there must be a federal nexus."8 This scope was further narrowed
in Grove City College v. Bell, 9 a 1984 United States Supreme
Court decision limiting the scope of federal civil rights to the spe-
cific program receiving aid, not to the entire scope of the recipient
entity.2 0 Grove City was subsequently overturned by the Civil
ment of Labor, requires that federal contractors take affirmative action in hiring and pro-
moting qualified disabled persons. Id. § 794.
11. Id. § 794.
12. Id.
13. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1991). This is the concept of providing feasible adjustments in the
workplace, such as modifying work schedules, making the workplace accessible, and provid-
ing recorders or interpreters. See infra pp. 89-94.
15. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.21-23 (1991). The elements of the program, including employment
opportunities, must be accessible. New structures and alterations are to be fully accessible.
Older structures need only be partially modified, e.g., first floor, entrance, toilets, etc., as
long as all services, activities and programs are accessible.
16. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980); see also 28 C.F.R. 42(G) (1980).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988 & Supp. H 1990). Note that the Rehabilitation Act as origi-
nally enacted covered a "handicapped person." The popular term in usage today is "person
with a disability." In the 1992 extension of the Rehabilitation Act the syntax of the law was
changed to "person with a disability." Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1988).
19. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
20. Id.
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Rights Restoration Act of 1988.21 This legislation's enactment was
contemporaneous with the birth of comprehensive disability civil
rights legislation.
The clarion call for a national law prohibiting discrimination
against persons with disabilities, regardless of federal funding,
came from a small federal agency, the National Council on Disabil-
ity, in two mid-1980s reports.22
In 1988, the Americans with Disabilities Act was introduced in
both the Senate28 and the House of Representatives.24 However,
the bills died with the end of the 100th Congress. In 1989, the leg-
islative process accelerated; new bills were introduced in both
chambers. Finally, the Senate held hearings and passed the ADA."8
After four committees reviewed the proposed legislation, the
House of Representatives passed its version of the ADA in 1990.26
Following a conference between both chambers,27 President Bush
signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990.28 More than 2000 peo-
ple, many of them persons with disabilities, were on the South
Lawn of the White House for the historic occasion.
The ADA, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but unlike Title V of
the Rehabilitation Act, bans discrimination regardless of whether
the employer, the place of public accommodation, state or local
government or any other covered entity receives any federal finan-
cial assistance, or has a federal contract or federal financial nexus.
The ADA has five major components. Title 129 relates to employ-
ment. Discrimination is prohibited by employers of twenty-five or
more persons as of July 26, 1992, and employers-of fifteen or more
persons as of July 26, 1994.30 Title I131 bans discrimination in pro-
grams and activities, including employment, by all state and local
21. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
22. National Council on Disability, Toward Independence (1986); National Council on
Disability, On the Threshold of Independence (1988).
23. S. 2343, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
24. H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
25. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
26. H.R. RFp. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. pts. I-IV (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267. The House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor pub-
lished a three-volume history on the Americans with Disabilities Act.
27. H.R. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
28. See 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (Supp. II 1990).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. II. 1990).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (Supp. II 1990).
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government entities, regardless of the number of employees or
budget, and by the National Rail Passenger Corporation (AM-
TRAK) as of January 26,-1992.2 Title II also has provisions re-
lated to non-discrimination by entities providing public transpor-
tation.33 Title III bans discrimination in places of public
accommodation as well as commercial facilities, effective January
26, 1992.34 Public transportation provided by private entities, as
their main business or in connection with their primary other busi-
ness, is also under a Title III non-discrimination mandate.3 5 Title
IV requires telecommunication relay systems to be established by
July 26, 1993, and federally funded public service announcements
to be closed captioned.36 Titles I through IV each require federal
regulations to be finalized within one year after the enactment .of
the law; this is a congressional reaction to the failure of the Execu-
tive Branch to issue rules in a timely manner under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.37 Title V38 contains key sections, including.
provisions against insurance discrimination and no preemption of
state/local laws which afford the person with a disability more pro-
tection than provided by the ADA.
While this commentary addresses employment from the perspec-
tive of the EEOC regulations under Title I, the importance of the
other provisions of the ADA should not be understated. State and
local governments are significant employers and providers of pro-
grams, services, and activities. As the programs, services, and activ-
ities become more accessible to persons with disabilities, so too will
the workplaces. The Department of Justice regulations under ADA
Title II provide that an employer subject to Title II, e.g. a city
employing twenty-five or more persons as of July 26, 1992, should
follow the EEOC rules. If not subject to the EEOC rules, the gov-
ernment entity should follow the Department of Justice's rules
under section 504.39 Like governmental entities, private entities
which accommodate the public and commercial facilities will be
making themselves more accessible to comply with the Department
32. Id. § 12131(1)(A)-(C).
33. Id. §§ 12141-65.
34. Id. §§ 12181-89.
35. Id. § 12184.
36. 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (Supp. 1 1990).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12134, 12164, 12186 (Supp. II 1990); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (Supp. II
1990).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (Supp. II 1990).
39. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1992).
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of Justice rules under Title 111.40 As entities make their programs
and activities accessible, equal employment is enhanced. As relay
systems under Title IV come into an area, communication in the
workplace will be easier and more accessible. Title V, in conjunc-
tion with insurance reforms and stronger state and local laws, is
important in the employment context.
III. EMPLOYMENT BASICS
Meeting its statutory obligation, the EEOC published final regu-
lations on July 26, 1991.41 The ADA prohibits discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities in all phases of em-
ployment, whether or not the employer or covered entity receives a
federal contract or grant. The ADA covers everything related to
employment: outreach and recruiting; interviewing, hiring, and
promoting; making reasonable accommodation pay rates, compen-
sation, job assignments, progression, and seniority; sick, annual, or
other leave; benefits and training; layoff, termination, and recall;
employer social and recreational functions; and any other job privi-
leges, terms, and conditions. Employers may not limit, classify, or
segregate an employee in a manner which adversely affects em-
ployment opportunity or status because of a disability. Contractual
or other arrangements or relationships which effect discrimination
on a covered entity's employees or applicants are also forbidden by
the ADA.42 It is illegal to utilize standards, criteria, or methods of
administration which are discriminatory or perpetuate job-related
discrimination. Similarly prohibited are qualification standards,
employment tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out individuals with a disability unless the standard, test, or
selection criteria is job-related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.43 Employment tests must be se-
lected and administered on a non-discriminatory basis and must
reasonably measure the skills, aptitude and other relevant employ-
40. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1992).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1992). That same day the Department of Justice published the final
regulations for Title II, Non-discrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local
Government Services, 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1992), and for Title III, Non-discrimination on the
Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36
(1992).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(i)(2) (Supp. H 1990); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.5 to .6 (1992).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(6) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.7 to .10 (1992).
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ment factors. In brief, covered entities may not discriminate in any
aspect of the job.""
Although an employer is not required to be clairvoyant about a
disabling condition, the employer may not ignore the existence of a
disability either. The coverage of employers is extensive. Employ-
ers who engage in interstate commerce are covered. Unions and
employment agencies are also under the ADA mandate, as they
were under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indian tribes and bona
fide tax exempt membership clubs, such as private clubs, are not
covered by the ADA. The federal government is not covered by the
ADA but is subject to the same non-discrimination mandate under
the Rehabilitation Act.45 However, Congress brought itself under
the ADA umbrella.46 Religious entities, including religious schools,
are covered but can require conformance to the religious tenets of
the organization.4 7 It is interesting to note that lawyers can be em-
ployers under the ADA, just as they are under state anti-discrimi-
nation laws.48
IV. DISPELLING THE MYTHS
A. Employers Subject to the ADA
While coverage of the ADA is quite broad, there are some mis-
conceptions about which entities are subject to the law. The belief
that the ADA covers all employers, even "mom and pop" employ-
ers, is erroneous. As of July 26, 1992, under Title I, the ADA covers
entities which employ twenty-five or more persons. Beginning July
26, 1994, entities that employ fifteen or more persons will be cov-
ered. The smaller non-governmental employers, "mom and pop
businesses," are not covered by the ADA.4" All state and local gov-
ernment employers, regardless of size or budget, are covered by Ti-
tle II and the Department of Justice regulations.50 However, the
definition of employer in Title I of the ADA leads to a misconcep-
tion related to coverage.
44. 42 U.S.C § 12112 (Supp. H 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 to .11 (1992).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12509(b) (Supp. H 1990).
47. Id. § 12113(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(a) (1992).
48. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (Supp. H 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (1992).
50. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1992). The regulation specifically prohibits employment dis-
crimination by a "public entity." Id.
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It is a myth that it is legal for entities with less than twenty-five
employees (or less than fifteen employees after July 26, 1994) to
discriminate against persons with disabilities. While it may not vi-
olate Title I of the ADA because it has fewer employees than Title
I requires, a state/local government employer of any size that dis-
criminated would violate Title 1I.51 A smaller private entity not
subject to Title I could well violate state laws. Many states, includ-
ing Virginia,52 currently prohibit employment discrimination
against qualified persons with disabilities by entities employing
fewer than fifteen persons. 5 Title V of the ADA requires that state
and local laws affording persons with disabilities more protection
than the ADA are not preempted.5 Neither the EEOC nor the De-
partment of Justice makes mention in their ADA rules of the state
or local non-discrimination laws applicable to smaller employers.
This glaring omission could leave the impression that these entities
are not under any equal oppoitunity in employment mandate.55
B. Persons Protected by the ADA
Just as there are misconceptions about which employers are cov-
ered, there is confusion as to who is protected. There is a myth
that the ADA is a wheelchair rights law. However, the ADA in-
cludes persons in wheelchairs as well as other persons who are mo-
bility-impaired. It is wrong to think of the ADA as a law only for
persons in wheelchairs. Persons with other disabilities are clearly
covered.
Under the ADA, "disability" with regard to an individual is: (a)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual; (b) a record of such an
impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment.58
A major life activity refers to functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, talking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, and working.5 7
51. See id.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
53. See CHARLES D. GOLDMAN, DISABILITY RIGHTS GUIDE, PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO
PROBLEMS AFFECTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES app. I (2d ed. 1991).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (Supp. II 1990).
55. Cf. Yates v. Volunteer Health Care Sys., 783 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Va. 1992).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. H 1990); see also Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657
(Mich. 1992).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
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There is no exhaustive list of disabling conditions or impair-
ments which lead to coverage under the ADA in either the statute
or the implementing regulations from the EEOC. Nor does the De-
partment of Justice have a list in its regulations. Under the ADA, a
person having multiple sclerosis, being HIV positive, or having
full-blown AIDS is clearly covered just as the person who is vision,
hearing, or mobility impaired, or a person who is learning
disabled. 8
The belief that the ADA covers only qualified persons with disa-
bilities and that able-bodied persons have no ADA rights is mis-
placed. The ADA states in no uncertain terms that it is also dis-
crimination to deny equal employment opportunity to an otherwise
qualified individual because of the known disability of a person
with whom the qualified individual is known to have a family, bus-
iness, social, or other relationship or association.59 Thus, the parent
of a child with special needs, such as diabetes, who is qualified and
can perform essential job functions, may not be denied employ-
ment or terminated because he or she may need leave to take care
of the child. An individual whose partner is HIV positive or an
alcoholic may not be terminated on that basis since HIV and alco-
holism are disabling conditions covered by the ADA.
Many people erroneously believe that the ADA protects drug
users. The term "disability" does not include the illegal use of
drugs and an employer or other covered entity may act on the ba-
sis of such use. However, an individual who has successfully com-
pleted a supervised drug rehabilitation program or has otherwise
been successfully rehabilitated and is no longer engaging in the il-
legal use of drugs is covered. Also covered is an individual who no
longer uses illegal drugs and participates in a supervised rehabili-
tation program. Persons erroneously perceived as taking illegal
drugs are also protected. The ADA does not limit employer con-
ducted random testing for illegal drugs; however, the EEOC does
not encourage such tests.60 The ADA does not limit an employer's
ability to require adherence to alcohol or drug free workplace laws
and policies.1
58. 28 C.F.R. pts. 35-36 (1992).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (Supp. H 1990).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(2) (Supp. II 1990); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(c) (1992).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c) (Supp. H 1990). For the same under the Rehabilitation Act see
Cogeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d.1139 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1992]
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The ADA is not a gay rights bill. The ADA states clearly that
homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments, and thus, are
not disabilities under the ADA. Transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavior dis-
orders are not covered. Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or py-
romania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from
current illegal use of drugs are other conditions not considered to
qualify as "disabilities" under the ADA.6
2
While the ADA is not a gay rights bill, certain states, such as the
District of Columbia, prohibit discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation or preference." Again, this emphasizes that employers
should not rely exclusively on the ADA but must be cognizant of
state and local law in this area.
C. ADA Requirements
Misconceptions also surround the requirements of covered enti-
ties and their obligations to persons protected by the ADA. What
an employer must do, who is a qualified person, and determination
of job standards are issues which arise in this regard. The ADA is
not a hiring law, requiring employers to hire persons with disabili-
ties. The ADA is not an affirmative action law as that term has
come to be known. There are no goals or quotas set forth in the
Act or the EEOC regulations. The ADA is fundamentally an equal
opportunity law requiring that qualified persons with disabilities
be afforded meaningful access to employment.64 This means that
employers have to take certain actions, such as expanding their
outreach recruiting to include persons with disabilities, posting no-
tices about the ADA in the work place, and making accommoda-
tions. ADA requires opportunities for qualified persons with disa-
bilities. Employers will have to take meaningful, not token, actions
to ensure that all phases of the employment relationship are truly
grounded in equal opportunity for qualified individuals with
disabilities.
1636 (1989); see also Desper v. Montgomery County, 727 F. Supp. 1959 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
Little v. F.B.I., 793 F. Supp. 652 (D. Md. 1992).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12211 (Supp. II 1990).
63. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992).
64. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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1. Determining Who is Qualified
It is wrong to believe that persons with disabilities are all quali-
fied or unqualified. How this myth is approached depends on one's
perspective; employers may think that all persons with disabilities
are unqualified, and on the other hand, persons with disabilities
may think that they are inherently qualified. Legalistically, the
EEOC has made clear that whether an individual is qualified is
based o~n education, skill, experience, and other job-related re-
quirements of the job that the disabled person seeks or holds.65
This can include a determination of whether the person with a dis-
ability has a license, such as a driver's license or a license to prac-
tice law, which is a bona fide requirement for the job. There is case
law under the Rehabilitation Act that a court must look behind an
employer's stated job requirements, including licensing, to deter-
mine if the individual is otherwise qualified.66 Nothing in the ADA
or the EEOC rules requires any employer to hire, to provide bene-
fits to, or to consider any unqualified person whether or not the
person has a disability.
2. "Essential Duties"
Under the ADA an "otherwise qualified individual with a disa-
bility" is an individual who can perform the essential duties of the
job with or without reasonable accommodation.17 Not all job func-
tions are essential. "Essential functions" is an ADA introduced
regulatory term. It embraces the skills, judgments, expertise, and
tasks that the individual must actually perform in order to succeed
in the position.68 Functions which are not essential are deemed
marginal. The EEOC enumerates several factors to be weighed in
applying this definition. A function may be essential because the
job may exist to perform that function, for example answering the
telephone or opening the bridge, or the job may entail using a spe-
cialized skill, such as foreign language proficiency. Time devoted to
a task is not dispositive. The firefighter must be able to carry a
person from a burning structure, even though this may not happen
every day or every week. However, the consequences of not being
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
66. Pandazides v. Virginia, 946 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1991) (Individual found not qualified on
remand, No. 90-1081-A (E.D. Va. 1992)).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. H 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1992).
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able to perform that task are profound. The EEOC recognizes that
the terms of collective bargaining agreements may be examined,
but are not dispositive in determining essential job functions. The
current work experience of incumbents in the actual job or similar
jobs are also relevant.69 The EEOC also notes that the employer's
judgment and job description prepared before advertising or inter-
viewing are also relevant.70
This latter provision, much like the provision for employment
standards, is the employer's institutional edge, particularly in cases
involving hiring for a new position. Sound management will take a
good, hard look at a job and make an honest assessment of what is
expected of the incumbent. However, an unscrupulous employer
could abuse the decision-making process related to determining
what is an essential function. The ADA helps to prevent this by
making the job description admissible only if prepared before the
interview or job announcement. 1
3. Job-Related Standards
The ADA does not set forth employment standardsfor employ-
ers; nevertheless, the ADA does require that any applicable per-
formance standards be job-related and consistent with business ne-
cessity if used to screen out an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability. In fact, the ADA does *not require that an employer
even have employment standards or position descriptions. Realisti-
cally though, larger employers invariably have them and, in fact,
state and local governments' civil service laws and policies gener-
ally mandate them.
Furthermore, the ADA does not preclude an employer from hav-
ing standards for an employee relating to co-worker or workplace
safety.7 12 However, in attempting to apply this concept, the EEOC
commits a patent error. It misinterprets the ADA's express provi-
sions related to performance standards while abusing the public
rulemaking process.
Under the statute, an employment qualification standard may
require that an individual not pose a direct threat to the health or
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)-(vi) (1992).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(ii) (1992).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990).
72. Id. § 12113(b).
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safety of other individuals in the workplace. 73 The EEOC's final
regulation74 clearly misconstrues this ADA provision" by inter-
preting it as banning discrimination when the individual with a
disability is a danger to himself, not, as the statute clearly states,
to other individuals in the workplace. The EEOC ADA regulation
articulates the agency's interpolation of the criteria of School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline,"7 to assess the risk of harm to
the health or safety of the individual as well as to others in the
workplace.17
The EEOC makes a major gaffe. The employment provision in
ADA Title I regarding safety is clear on its face. The Title I danger
to others provisions do not mean danger to self. The danger to self
provisions in Title I are consistent with a related provision in Title
III regarding public accommodations which the Department of
Justice interprets as a danger to others, not a danger to self rule.7 8
Moreover, in reaching its erroneous conclusions EEOC was
shamefully unfaithful to the public rulemaking process. In its final
rulemaking, the EEOC makes no mention of the landmark case In-
ternational Association of United Auto Workers v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc.79 Johnson Controls invalidated, as contrary to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 Title VII, an employer's rule disqualifying
childbearing-aged women from positions exposing them to poten-
tial dangers of lead batteries. Johnson Controls was decided after
the EEOC published its proposed rules. At least two commentators
on the proposed rule, the National Council on Disability and the
Disability Rights Education Defense Fund cited Johnson Controls
in their comments, urging that the EEOC rule be revised to be a
danger to others or property, not a danger to self rule. In short, the
73. Id.
74. 29 C.F.R §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.15(b)(2) (1992).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1990).
76. 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
77. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)). For an exam-
ple of a court applying the Arline criteria under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, compare
Doe v. District of Columbia, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 363 (D.D.C. 1992). For an
example of a state court applying state anti-discrimination law in a danger to self situation
involving a temporary sheriff officer with limited vision, see Greenwood v. State Police
Training Center, No. A-47, 606 A.2d 336 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1992), 3 NDLRS). See also Doe v.
Washington University, 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991); In re Westchester County Medi-
cal Center, 3 NAT. DisAB. L. REP. 152 (1992).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (1992); see also Anderson v. Little
League Baseball, 794 F. Supp. 342 (D.C. Ariz. 1992) (following Arline to interpret the direct
threat provisions in ADA Title I to mean a danger to others, not self).
79. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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EEOC's interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the stat-
ute, and patently flaunts the Administrative Procedure Act80 by
not addressing significant public comments in promulgating the fi-
nal danger to self rule.
The adverse public policy and practical risks of this provision
are multiple. The EEOC sets employers up to fail by making them
"Big Brother" of the qualified disabled person. The message that
"Employer knows best" is incompatible with the core ADA con-
cepts of ending discrimination and promoting full opportunity to
participate.8 1 In addition to denigrating qualified disabled persons,
the EEOC, by its obvious error, has exposed employers who rely on
this provision to possible needless litigation.
As a practical matter, employers must focus, not on the individ-
ual's potential danger to himself, but on whether the person with a
disability can do the essential functions with or without reasonable
accommodation. For example, if an individual having epileptic
seizures applies to work as a machinist, the employer might refuse
to hire the applicant, believing, based on the employer's genera-
lized knowledge of epilepsy and seizures, that the individual could
harm himself. That would be discrimination and contrary to the
statute. However, it would not be discriminatory for the employer
to refuse to hire the applicant if the employer had reason to be-
lieve, based on a legal pre-employment physical examination given
to all persons in that job category, the individual would be unable
to operate the equipment, even with reasonable accommodation, or
would actually somehow harm the equipment due to uncontrolled
and irregular seizures.8 2 Employers are well advised to tread lightly
in this area and pay particular attention to the distinction between
essential and non-essential (marginal) job functions and the risks
to property and co-workers. Employers should never articulate
whatever unstated thoughts they may have about an individual be-
ing a danger to himself. Employers should think and act upon an
individual's ability to perform essential job functions. Think and
act upon real, not projected, danger to others or danger to property
80. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
82. Cf. Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1991); Chalk v.
United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Tisch v. United States Postal
Serv., H-83-333 (C.D. Conn. 1987); Jansen v. Food Serv., C-2040-83, (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1992).
[Vol. 27:73
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
in the work place. Avoid danger to self like the proverbial plague
when making a decision or when interviewing.
4. Interviewing
The general rule under the ADA regarding interviewing is that it
is unlawful to ask an employee or an applicant whether he is an
individual with a disability or about the severity of the disability.83
Thus, the old laundry list of questions about specific conditions is
illegal. However, an employer may ask an applicant - able-bodied
or with a disability - questions about his ability to perform job-
related functions and to demonstrate how, with or without reason-
able accommodations, the person will perform the job-related func-
tions. Again, although an individual is unable to perform the mar-
ginal job functions, if the person can perform the essential ones,
the person is qualified.8 4
A test which screens out or which tends to screen out individuals
with disabilities is valid, if it is job-related, consistent with busi-
ness necessity, and the performance of that job (or component
test) cannot be achieved by reasonable accommodation. 5 Again,
decisions must be based on facts, not subjective suppositions.86
5. Physical Examinations
Physical examinations are another critical employment area.
The EEOC makes clear that there are three circumstances in
which such examinations may be given: pre-employment hiring; on
the job "fitness for duty" examinations; and in wellness programs,
i.e., an employee benefit.8 7
The EEOC correctly notes that pre-employment physicals are
lawful.88 Employment offers may be conditioned on such exams
provided all employees in the same job category, not all entering
employees, are subject to the same examination or inquiry. 9 The
83. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13-14 (1992).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1992).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1992).
86. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-85 (1987): Antonsen v.
Ward, 571 N.E.2d 636, 638-39 (N.Y. 1991).
87. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13-.14; see 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749-35,751 (1991).
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1992).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(3) (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1992).
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EEOC notes that agility tests given to all similarly situated appli-
cants are not physical examinations."
A second area of legitimate physical examinations and inquiries
is whether the employee can perform job-related functions, consis-
tent with business necessity. This is the traditional "fitness-for-
duty" examination which is given when job performance issues
arise."1 Finally, the ADA allows "wellness examinations" when an
employer provides medical benefits.2
The EEOC cautions that all medical information must be kept
as separate forms in separate, confidential medical records and
used only for purposes of the ADA.9 3 This includes allowing pre-
employment information to be used for purposes of obtaining in-
surance. Also, supervisors and managers may be informed if the
disabling condition necessitates restrictions on the employee's
work or duties, and of any necessary accommodations.9 4 First aid
and safety personnel may be informed if the disability might re-
quire emergency treatment." Finally, government investigators
checking on ADA compliance may be informed.98
D. The Impact of State Laws
Lamentably, in myopic Washington fashion, the EEOC fails to
caution employers about state laws which may impose more strin-
gent criminal penalties or unlimited civil damages for disclosure of
a disability, such as AIDS. Because section 501(b) of the ADA98
provides that state provisions affording disabled persons with more
protection are not pre-empted, the EEOC offers what is really an
illusory list of potential circumstances for disclosure. This EEOC
failure again raises the risk of employer error. While proceeding in
accordance with the ADA, an employer may wrongfully disclose in-
formation resulting in a wrongful invasion of privacy, an action
redressable with unlimited damages, compared to the limited dam-
ages recoverable under the ADA.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1992).
91. Id. § 1630.14(c).
92. Id. § 1630.14(d).
93. Id. § 1630.14(d)(1) (1992).
94. Id. § 1630.14(d)(1)(i).
95. Id. § 1630.14(d)(1)(ii).
96. Id. § 1630.14(d)(1)(iii).
97. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1990).
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E. Reasonable Accommodation
Perhaps the most visible term in the ADA, with its history dat-
ing back to the Rehabilitation Act, is that of "reasonable accom-
modation." The ADA requires a covered entity to make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business. 9 Also, a covered entity cannot deny an employment op-
portunity to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability be-
cause of the need for reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental impairment of the employee or applicant.100
The concept of reasonable accommodation has been grist for the
judicial mill under the Rehabilitation Act.101 Reasonable accommo-
dation for employees means providing interpreters or readers,
making the workplace accessible, modifying work schedules, (which
can be done in the context of flex-time), acquiring or modifying
equipment, and adjusting or modifying examinations, training
materials, or policies. It may even include reassignment of a cur-
rent employee.1 0 2 Reasonable accommodation may include allowing
an employee to work at home 03 or granting a light duty assign-
ment, depending upon the facts. 04 Allowing an individual who
needs to take prescription drugs during the workday to store some
medication in a company's health unit is another example.
Reasonable accommodation is a balancing of the employer's le-
gitimate business needs with the employee's need for meaningful
equal opportunity in employment.10 5 Reasonable accommodation is
not a fundamental alteration of the job or a requirement that an
employer incur an undue hardship.106
99. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1992).
100. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(b) (1992).
101. Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988); Simon v. St. Louis
County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
102. See infra pp. 91-92.
103. See Langon v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 959 F.2d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
104. Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d. 1179 (11th Cir. 1991) (HIV
positive firefighter discharged after refusing light duty assignment was not discriminated
against on the basis of his handicap).
105. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
106. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), (p) (1992); Desper v. Montgomery County, 727 F. Supp.
959 (E.D. Pa. 1990); cf. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (Rehabilita-
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Despite all the history, experience, and case law, misconceptions
about the concept of reasonable accommodation remain. These
misconceptions commonly break down into four categories.
1. Financial Hardship to Employers
The first misconception is that reasonable accommodations will
be a perennial problem and will bankrupt covered employers.
However, the duty to make reasonable accommodation is perennial
in the sense that it is an ongoing obligation of the employer. While
regrettably not stated in the EEOC rules, most persons with disa-
bilities do not require accommodation. 10 7 Bear in mind that those
accommodations which are an "undue hardship" are not required
of an employer. This means conducting an analysis to determine
the net cost to the employer. The analysis covers tax breaks 08 and
payments by outside sources, such as the state or local vocational
rehabilitation agency, or even the individual employee. Other fac-
tors related to undue hardship include the employer's financial re-
sources, operation of the employment site, and the employer's rela-
tionship, both financially and operationally, with any parent
entity. The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of
the facility, including the impact on the ability of employees to do
their job and the facility's ability to conduct business is also
considered. 10 9
No finite formula, based on the cost of the accommodation and
the employer's profits or employee's salary, exists to determine
whether a particular accommodation is reasonable. In fact, the
EEOC notes in its Preamble to the final rules that Congress re-
jected an amendment which would have limited an employer's
duty to accommodate to not more than ten percent of the em-
ployee's salary.1 0 In a landmark decision under the Rehabilitation
Act, blind welfare caseworkers earning between $21,000 and
$23,000 per year were entitled to readers, an expense of $6,000 per
year in the agency's overall budget of $300 million."'
tion Act does not require a college to eliminate oral communication in order to accommo-
date deaf students in a registered nursing program).
107. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., at 38 (1989).
108. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9), (10); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), (p) (1992).
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 3573 (1991).
111. Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985).
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Another myth is that employers are not entitled to any financial
breaks for complying with the ADA.
In fact, tax incentives as well as other funding sources are availa-
ble to aid employers in complying with the ADA. Congress passed
tax relief for small entities, defined as persons with thirty or fewer
employees or less than $1 million in sales. A tax credit of 50% of
expenditures in excess of $250 but not exceeding $10,250 is offered
for removing architectural, transportation and communication bar-
riers."" Finally, all businesses can qualify for a tax deduction of up
to $15,000 for barrier removal. 113
Another credit is the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit ("TJTC"), con-
sisting of 40% of a "disadvantaged" (a term which includes dis-
abled persons) new employee's salary. The maximum credit is
$2,400 per employee. State, local, and private vocational rehabilita-
tion agencies also help employers by funding a person as a job
coach to train the person with a disability on the job. It is not
unknown for the disabled person to bring special equipment from
home or otherwise contribute, although it is not required.
Funding issues are but one of the major myths surrounding rea-
sonable accommodation.
2. A Lowered Quality Workforce
The second misconception is that reasonable accommodation
will force employers to hire disabled persons for position they are
not qualified to hold. This is false because it is not discriminatory
to refuse a position to a disabled person if the person cannot per-
form the essential job functions even with the accommodation. 1 4
Under the ADA, the duty to make reasonable accommodation in
employment 'clearly applies for all applicants as well as current
employees. A nonexhaustive list of examples of reasonable accom-
modations for applicants includes: providing a reader for a vision
impaired person to help complete the application; making the in-
terview site accessible to a mobility-impaired applicant; providing
a sign language interpreter for a deaf person being interviewed;
112. I.R.C. § 44(a), (b) (Supp. 1 1990).
113. I.R.C. §§ 190. (This expired in mid-1992 but is likely to be included in 1993 tax
legislation).
114. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m), 1630.4.56 (1992).
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and providing alternative testing or additional time for a learning
disabled applicant to complete a test.115
The EEOC makes clear that the duty to make reasonable accom-
modation for an applicant does not include reassignment to a va-
cant position. For an applicant to be protected by the ADA, the
person must be qualified.""
Reassignment to a vacant position is but one method of reasona-
bly accommodating current employees. However, as the EEOC
notes, reassignment to a vacant position should be used when ac-
commodation within the person's current position would pose an
undue hardship. Reassignment from a food handling position is
not discrimination and is required under the ADA if an individual
has one of the contagious or infectious conditions (e.g., hepatitis)
listed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 711 and the
risk of transmission cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommo-
dation. Having AIDS or being HIV positive is not on the list. If
reassignment is not possible, it is not discriminatory to terminate
an individual with such a condition.
Reasonable accommodation works best when the disabled em-
ployee is consulted by management after the need for accommoda-
tion has been identified. In its regulatory materials, the EEOC
notes a four step process of analyzing the job to determine essen-
tial functions, while consulting with the individual to determine
the job related limitations and potential accommodations. The em-
ployer is wise to consider, but need not implement, the preference
of the individual with a disability. 18 However, if the individual re-
jects an offer of reasonable accommodation, the individual could
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(b) (1992); see also Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir.
1983) (accommodation for testing required where written examination was not an accurate
measure of qualifications).
116. See, e.g., Wood v. School Dist. of Omaha, 784 F. Supp. 1441, 1452 (D. Neb. 1992)
(finding no reasonable accommodation possible in a case involving diabetic school bus driv-
ers); see also Pima Community College, OCR No. 09-91-2070, 2NDLR § 186 in which the
Office for Civil Rights found no discrimination because the applicant for a computer
programmer analyst position, a person with paranoid schizophrenia, was not a qualified
handicapped person. She did not have sufficient knowledge or experience of the language
and programming skills required and no reasonable accommodation would have enabled
performance of essential job functions.
117. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,897-98 (1991).
118. Id. at 35,748.
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lose the protection of the ADA as he would no longer be considered
a qualified individual with a disability.11
The 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act provide that if an
employer, in consultation with the disabled person, makes a good
faith effort to identify and make a reasonable accommodation to
provide the disabled individual with an equally effective opportu-
nity that is not an undue hardship on the business, damages may
not be awarded.12 0 This provision applies to claims under the ADA
as well as against the federal government under section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act.12 - Because the new law was adopted after the
EEOC issued its final regulations, the EEOC did not mention the
Civil Rights Act implications of a meaningful dialogue. Such good
faith efforts by the employer can work to preclude .a claim for
damages.
3. Quadriplegics and Personal Assistants
The EEOC is very remiss in addressing the issue of accommoda-
tions for quadriplegics.
The belief that quadriplegics do not require personal assistants
as a reasonable accommodation in the workplace, except as page
turners or attendants when traveling, is misleading.122 In response
to its proposed rule, the EEOC received comments from the public
and the National Council on Disability urging that personal assist-
ants be expressly recognized as a reasonable accommodation. Yet
the EEOC provides no unequivocal guidance on this issue in the
final rule. Unrealistically, the EEOC only mentions personal assist-
ants as page turners or as travel companions. Every person must
do certain non-work related activities during the work day. These
include using bathroom facilities as well as eating lunch. The
EEOC's failure to respond to public comment creates an unneces-
sary ambiguity which could lead employers in the wrong direction
119. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (1992); see Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir.
1992) (nurse who refused reassignment and reasonable accommodation offered by her fed-
eral employer was found unqualified to perform her old job and thus was not protected by
the Rehabilitation Act); LeMere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D.C. 1988); Franklin v.
U.S. Postal Service, 46 F.E.P. Case 1734 (D. Ohio 1988) (employee not qualified when not
taking required medication.).
120. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(a)(3)).
121. Id.
122. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1992).
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and result in quadriplegic persons not being hired. Employers are
best advised to weigh the issue of a personal assistant as an across-
the-board issue, using the same criteria as they would to determine
if any other accommodation were reasonable.
More than any other phrase, "reasonable accommodation" has
become synonymous with the duty not to discriminate in the em-
ployment of qualified individuals with disabilities. However, the
duty not to discriminate is actually more extensive, leading to the
next myth.
4. Reasonable Accommodation and ADA Compliance
It is erroneously believed that the duty to make reasonable ac-
commodation ensures compliance with the ADA's employment
provisions. However, the duty not to discriminate includes not only
the duty to make reasonable accommodation, but also extends to
recruiting, advertising, job application procedures, hiring, promo-
tions, layoffs, job assignments in terms of both substantive work
and location, job classifications, job progressions, pay, administra-
tion of tests, seniority lists, leave, training, social and recreational
activities, and fringe benefits. 2 3 An employer may not do by con-
tract that which the employer cannot do directly.124 Reasonable ac-
commodation is the most notable and crucial requirement; how-
ever, it is not the exclusive one. For example, when doing outreach
recruiting, the employer seeks to meet people from new groups and
forums. When posting the required notice of compliance with the
ADA, 125 no accommodation is involved. Building a new barrier free
structure for employees meets the building code and the ADA. It is
not an issue of reasonable accommodation. Utilizing a third party
provider of benefits who is both accessible and non-discriminatory
would be in compliance with the ADA, yet no accommodation has
been made.
F. Benefits
Benefits issues, particularly health insurance and workers' com-
pensation, are minefields for which the EEOC has provided only
the sketchiest of roadmaps. The EEOC makes it clear that an em-
123. Id. § 1630.4.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16 (1992).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12115 (Supp. II 1990).
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ployer may not refuse to hire an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability simply because the employer's health or workers'
compensation premiums may rise.
126
The EEOC should have consulted with the benefits experts in
other federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor and the
Internal Revenue Service, but did not do so. The EEOC could now
issue added regulations; however, no consultations or added regula-
tions are in process.
Lamentably, the EEOC barely restates the statute in its regula-
tion. The EEOC clearly states that employers may administer ac-
tuarially based benefit plans.12 7 Employer provided or adminis-
tered health insurance plans can include exclusions for pre-existing
conditions, but employers may not use insurance as a subterfuge to
discriminate. Thus, a visually impaired person may be denied cov-
erage for ophthalmologic treatment as a preexisting condition but
not future orthopedic injuries.12
The EEOC's abdication of its mandate under the ADA by its
incomplete guidance is seen in the current employer benefits and
insurance litigation. A critical case is McGann v. H. and H. Music
Co., 29 where the self-insured employer's cutting the maximum life-
time benefits from $1 million to $5,000 and eliminating certain
other benefits was found not to be discriminatory. The employer
took these actions after one employee, the now deceased Mr. Mc-
Gann, began to file claims for AIDS-related treatment. Insurance
companies have also tried to rescind policies after learning a cov-
ered individual has a disabling condition. In New England Mutual
v. William Johnson,3 0 the attempt to rescind was judicially
rejected.' 3 '
The EEOC's final regulatory materials are sadly deficient by not
recognizing the real world issues generated by covering a person
126. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m) (1992).
127. 29 CFR 1630.16(f) (1992).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. II 1990); S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8485
(1989), H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419-420. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (1992).
129. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); see also Greenberg
v. H. & H. Music, 112 S. Ct. 1556 (1992).
130. No. 28359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
131. See also William Penn Life v. Sands, 912 F.2d 359 (11th Cir. 1990) (life policy appli-
cant's negative responses to application questions regarding prior specified medical condi-
tions did not entitle insurer to rescind the policy when negative responses were later proved
to be incorrect).
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with a disability. The EEOC's regurgitation of the statute does not
give either employees or employers adequate guidance about dis-
crimination in benefits insurance. The EEOC should have given
employers more guidance on when and under what circumstances
an employer's changing of insurance coverage or benefit plans
would or would not be discrimination in violation of the ADA.
Another variation on this theme, which the EEOC does not ad-
dress in its regulation or appendix, is how an employer can cope
with the rising cost of health insurance without violating the ADA.
The EEOC makes no mention that "cafeteria plans" by third. par-
ties or on a self-indemnity basis would eliminate insurance bias.
Under the cafeteria plan all employees are given the same sum cer-
tain as a benefit and then elect what coverages they seek, pre-na-
tal, major medical, mental health, etc. The ADA permitted exclu-
sions of pre-existing conditions still apply as do actuarially based
rules. The EEOC is delinquent in not mentioning this.
The EEOC also deserves criticism for not recognizing that health
insurance is among the most contracted for benefits which may not
be discriminatory. The EEOC also fails to give guidance in working
with subcontracts.'32 An employer could violate the ADA by con-
tracting for a benefit (or training session) at a site that is not ac-
cessible and by not making reasonable accommodation so that the
employment benefit is either not denied totally or not equal (as
opposed to the same as) to those provided able-bodied
employees. 133
V. REMEDIES
The ADA is a critical law and the consequences of noncompli-
ance can be profound. An individual can file a complaint with the
EEOC; a private right of action also exists.134 In addition to ob-
taining specific job related relief, backpay, benefits, and court
costs, attorneys' fees and damages are now recoverable. This is the
result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,135 which amended the ADA
to allow jury trials and damages. Damages are also recoverable
132. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (1992).
133. See Cooper v. ICC, EEOC No. 01913514 (Dec. 1991, rev'd on other grounds June,
1992) in which a federal employer discriminated against a mobility impaired employee with
multiple sclerosis by offering mammograms in a van that was not wheelchair accessible. See
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20; 56 Fed. Reg. 35735.36 (1991).
134. 42 U.S.C. 12117(a) (1990).
135. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
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from the federal government under a Rehabilitation Act claim.
While punitive damages are not recoverable against state and local
government entities, they are available against private employers;
compensatory damages are recoupable in cases of intentional dis-
crimination against all employers. The amount of damages per
claimant is capped, based on employer size as measured by the
number of employees:





501 and up $300,000
Readers are cautioned that the 102nd Congress considered but
did not adopt measures to limit the caps. 136 It is likely that the
103rd Congress will address the issue and could well enact legisla-
tion. In light of the negative consequences of failing to comply,
there is a premium on being pro-active to comply with the law.
VI. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES
The joke in the legal profession is that lawyers are now re-
printing their cards, deleting "Asbestos" and replacing it with
"Americans with Disabilities Act." Granted, although some litiga-
tion under any law is inevitable, there are actions that can be
taken so that the ADA does not become a "lawyer's relief act."
Positive interactions and employment practices can limit or avoid
litigation.
Both private and public employers need to make managers and
staff aware that the ADA is important. Moreover they must recog-
nize and meet their duty to comply. This is leadership. As a practi-
cal matter, if the supervisors and staff know something is impor-
tant to the boss, they will take it more seriously and will more
vigorously attempt to comply. Legalistically, the good faith efforts
to comply can mitigate potential penalties, as noted above.
As lawyers, you should examine the employer's present interac-
tions with the community's disabled persons. The local commission
designed to assist persons with disabilities may serve as an infor-
136. S. 2062, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); H.R. 3975, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
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mation resource and can effectively aid employers in outreach
recruiting, reasonable accommodation, and other issues.
A. Language
Employers must learn how to interact and communicate with
persons with disabilities. Just as the terms "African-American"
and "Persons of Gender" are now acceptable when interacting with
minorities and women, there is also a language of disability. Avoid
terms such as "cripple," or "confined to a wheelchair." As noted
previously, even the term "handicapped" has become passe, being
superseded by the term "person with a disability" or other terms
focusing on the person first, e.g. "person who is vision impaired,"
or "person who is hearing impaired." If you speak a person's lan-
guage and treat the individual with respect and dignity, the same
way as you would like to be treated, the individual will realize your
good intent.
B. Reviewing Employment Practices
However, making the ADA work is more than semantics. Em-
ployment practices need to be reviewed, adopted, communicated
and applied. Urge employers to regularly read each position
description. When evaluating the incumbent and before announc-
ing a vacancy are good times to do this. Is it accurate in describing
what the incumbent really must do to succeed? Do not let a job
description lay fallow. It will be cannon fodder for litigation. Hav-
ing a current, complete, and accurate job description is good busi-
ness and good government. Job descriptions prepared before a job
is announced or before the job is advertised are admissible on the
issue of essential job functions.13 7 If you have an administrative/
support position vacant and also need an interpreter/reader/at-
tendant, the employer should consider the feasibility of revising
the position description to include those duties as well.
C. Review Employment Physical Examination Practices
Employers should make sure all applicants in the particular job
category are given the same examination, which, if used to screen
out applicants, is job related consistent with business necessity.
Avoid general physical examinations. Utilizing specialists when ad-
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 1990).
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dressing issues of a particular disability can reduce litigation.
When considering issues of danger in the workplace, the decision
should be made on the basis of the danger to co-workers or prop-
erty in the workplace, not an individual being a danger to himself.
D. Posting Notice
Employers should post notices of compliance with the ADA just
as employers post notices of complying with the Civil Rights Act of
1964.138
E. Review Outreach and Recruiting Practices
Make sure that qualified persons with disabilities are part of the
target of the outreach and recruiting. Use the same techniques
which have proven effective in reaching minorities and women but
apply them to disability focused individuals and organizations.
F. Review Job Applications and Interviewing Techniques
When interviewing, employers should make sure all questions
which are used to screen out applicants are job related consistent
with business necessity. Unrelated questions or questions about a
disability or the severity of a disability should be avoided.
G. Reasonable Accommodations
Employers should develop and implement a policy on making
reasonable accommodations. Create functioning committees of
human resource/personnel, budgetary/financial, facilities, as well as
business operation and legal. Delegate to supervisors specified
levels of authority for expenditures. Let the committee decide the
requests for accommodation that entail greater expenditures.
Track all expenditures and interactions with the person seeking
accommodation. Consider alternatives, and where possible go with
the preference of the person seeking the accommodations. Such
practices build good will and an institutional memory of sources of
equipment and resources. This also shows a good faith effort,
which is important under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
138. Id. § 12115.
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H. AIDS and Communicable Diseases
Persons who have AIDS or are HIV positive are covered by the
ADA. The AIDS condition is very emotional and requires educa-
tion in the workplace. In helping employers to craft practice and
policy, bear in mind that state and local laws may afford the per-
son with the disability more protection than the ADA. Consider
AIDS and HIV in the context of first aid as well as other personnel
policies. Develop a practice of universal protocols in which the per-
son giving aid always wears gloves and a mask, regardless of
whether the recipient of the help has a known disability. This mea-
sure maximizes privacy of all individuals and meets the state and
local laws which may be more stringent than the ADA on
disclosure.
I. Emergency Evacuation
Employers should also be prepared for a mobility or a vision im-
paired person being on the top floor of a building when there is a
fire or power failure. Knowing where persons with disabilities are
regularly assigned and being prepared to provide help if the eleva-
tor is out of order can aid in evacuation. Have a backup person
designated in case the primary helpers are out of the office. Also
communication with the persons with disabilities can make them
aware of what to expect in an emergency.
J. Contracting Policy
When contracting for any personnel related service, be it a
health benefit, training program, office holiday or social function,
employers should make sure the services will be accessible to the
known disabilities of employees. The employer is his "brother's
keeper," and is liable under the ADA to the employee if his con-
tractor errs. When contracting for a new office - either a new
building, suite, or an alteration, insist on compliance with the ADA
standards. Seeking to include clauses in the agreement whereby
the contractor agrees to comply fully with the ADA and will in-
demnify the employer from the costs, including but not limited to
damages, attorneys' fees, experts, and staff time in any action al-
leging a violation of the ADA, can shield an employer from liabil-
ity. Make sure this clause "flows down," i.e., is required to be in-
cluded in all subcontracts entered into by the prime contractor.
[Vol. 27:73
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
K. Insurance, Worker's Compensation and Other Benefits
Worker's compensation and insurance policies must be reviewed
for adherence to the ADA. Light duty and employee reassignment
policies can be prepared, as recognized reasonable accommoda-
tions, to keep qualified employees in the workforce, lowering com-
pensation premiums. This can be blended with the employer's con-
tracting practices.
L. Linkages.
Tie your efforts to meet the requirements of Title I with efforts
to comply with other parts of the ADA. A commercial entity
should dovetail their compliance efforts under Title III with efforts
under Title I. Similarly, state and local government entities want
to have their efforts under Title II dovetail with the employment
efforts under Title I. The objective is to build the biggest institu-
tional resource, making sure the axiomatic right hand knows what
the left is doing.
M. Updates
Employers should develop a policy of periodically reviewing
their ADA efforts; the duty to comply with the ADA is continuous.
The state of compliance at any one moment is but a freeze-frame
photo of an ongoing unlimited motion picture.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ADA is no guarantee against litigation. Nor does it promise
that persons with disabilities will get particular jobs. The EEOC's
regulations leave much to be desired for their lack of complete,
clear, correct guidance for employers as well as persons with disa-
bilities. As the ADA employment provisions enter the era of legal-
ity, society, including both employers and persons with disabilities,
must come to realize that the workplace is not limited to "perfect
persons. ' '139 Perhaps the greatest myth here is that this is the
Americans with Disabilities Act, when in reality the law is about
the abilities of persons.
139. See Ross v. Gama Shoes, Inc., 28 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 150 (1980).
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